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Abstrat
Byzantine agreement algorithms typially assume impliit initial state onsisteny and synhroniza-
tion among the orret nodes and then operate in oordinated rounds of information exhange to reah
agreement based on the input values. The impliit initial assumptions enable orret nodes to infer
about the progression of the algorithm at other nodes from their loal state. This paper onsiders a
more severe fault model than permanent Byzantine failures, one in whih the system an in addition
be subjet to severe transient failures that an temporarily throw the system out of its assumption
boundaries. When the system eventually returns to behave aording to the presumed assumptions it
may be in an arbitrary state in whih any synhronization among the nodes might be lost, and eah
node may be at an arbitrary state. We present a self-stabilizing Byzantine agreement algorithm that
reahes agreement among the orret nodes in an optimal ration of faulty to orret, by using only the
assumption of eventually bounded message transmission delay. In the proess of solving the problem,
two additional important and hallenging building bloks were developed: a unique self-stabilizing pro-
tool for assigning onsistent relative times to protool initialization and a Reliable Broadast primitive
that progresses at the speed of atual message delivery time.
Categories and Subjet Desriptors: C.2.4 [Distributed Systems℄: Distributed appliations;
General Terms: Algorithms, Reliability, Theory.
Keywords: Byzantine Agreement, Self-Stabilization, Byzantine Faults, Pulse Synhronization, Transient
Failures, Reliable Broadast.
1 Introdution
The Byzantine agreement (Byzantine Generals) problem was rst introdued by Pease, Shostak and Lam-
port [13℄. It is now onsidered as a fundamental problem in fault-tolerant distributed omputing. The task
is to reah agreement in a network of n nodes in whih up-to f nodes may be faulty. A distinguished node
(the General or the initiator) broadasts a value m, following whih all nodes exhange messages until the
∗
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non-faulty nodes agree upon the same value. If the initiator is non-faulty then all non-faulty nodes are
required to agree on the same value that the initiator sent.
Standard deterministi Byzantine agreement algorithms operate in the synhronous network model
in whih it is assumed that all orret nodes initialize the agreement proedure (and any underlying
primitives) at about the same time. By assuming onurrent initializations of the algorithm a synhronous
rounds struture an be enfored and used to infer on the progression of the algorithm from the point of
initialization. Moreover, there is always an impliit assumption about the onsisteny of the initial states
of all orret nodes, or at least a quorum of them.
We onsider a more severe fault-model in whih in addition to the permanent presene of Byzantine
failures, the system an also be subjet to severe transient failures that an temporarily throw all the
nodes and the ommuniation subsystem out of the assumption boundaries. E.g. resulting in more than
one third of the nodes being Byzantine or messages of non-faulty nodes getting lost or altered. This will
render the whole system pratially unworkable. Eventually the system must experienes a tolerable level
of permanent faults for a suiently long period of time. Otherwise it would remain unworkable forever.
When the system eventually returns to behave aording to the presumed assumptions, eah node may be
in an arbitrary state. It makes sense to require a system to resume operation after suh a major failure
without the need for an outside intervention to restart the whole system from srath or to orret it.
Classi Byzantine algorithms annot guarantee to exeute from an arbitrary state, beause they are
not designed with self-stabilization in mind. They typially make use of assumptions on the initial state
of the system suh as assuming all loks are initially synhronized or that the initial states are initialized
onsistently at all orret nodes (f. from the very rst polynomial solution [10℄ through many others
like [14℄). Conversely, A self-stabilizing protool onverges to its goal from any state one the system
behaves well again, but is typially not resilient to the permanent presene of faults.
In trying to ombine both fault models, Byzantine failures present a speial hallenge for designing
self-stabilizing distributed algorithms due to the ambition of maliious nodes to inessantly hamper sta-
bilization. This diulty may be indiated by the remarkably few algorithms resilient to both fault models
(see [4℄ for a review). The few published self-stabilizing Byzantine algorithms are typially ompliated
and sometimes onverge from an arbitrary initial state only after exponential or super exponential time
([8℄). Reently eient solutions were presented for the strit synhronization model in whih an outside
entity provides repetitive synhronized timing events at all orret nodes at one ([9℄).
In our model orret nodes annot assume a ommon referene to time or even to any ommon anhor
in time and they annot assume that any proedure or primitive initialize onurrently. This is the result of
the possible loss of synhronization following transient faults that might orrupt any agreement or oordi-
nation among the orret nodes and alter their internal states. Thus synhronization must be restored from
an arbitrary state while faing on-going Byzantine failures. This is a very triky task onsidering that all
urrent tools for ontaining Byzantine failures, suh as [2, 14℄, assume that synhronization already exists
and are thus preempted for use. Our protool ahieves self-stabilizing Byzantine agreement without the
assumption of any existing synhrony besides bounded message delivery. In [1℄ it is proven to be impossible
to ombine self-stabilization with even rash faults without the assumption of bounded message delivery.
Note that the problem is not relaxed even in the ase of a one-shot agreement, i.e. in ase that it
is known that the General will initiate agreement only one throughout the life of the system. Even if
the General is orret and even if agreement is initiated after the system has returned to its oherent
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behavior following transient failures, then the orret nodes might hold orrupted variable values that
might prevent the possibility to reah agreement. The nodes have no knowledge as to when the system
returns to oherent behavior or when the General will initiate agreement and thus annot target to reset
their memory exatly at this ritial time period. Reurrent agreement initialization by the General allows
for reurrent reset of memory with the assumption that eventually all orret nodes reset their memory in
a oherent state of the system and before the General initializes agreement. This introdues the problem
of how nodes an know when to reset their memory in ase of many ongoing onurrent invoations of
the algorithm, suh as in the ase of a faulty General disseminating several values all the time. In suh
a ase orret nodes might hold dierent sets of messages that were sent by other orret nodes as they
might reset their memory at dierent times.
In our protool, one the system omplies with the theoretially required bound of 3f < n permanent
Byzantine faulty nodes in a network of n nodes and messages are delivered within bounded time, following
a period of transient failures, then regardless of the state of the system, the goal of Byzantine agreement is
satised within O(f ′) ommuniation rounds (where f ′ ≤ f is the atual number of onurrent faults). The
protool an be exeuted in a one-shot mode by a single General or by reurrent agreement initializations
and by dierent Generals. It tolerates transient failures and permanent Byzantine faults and makes no
assumption on any initial synhronized ativity among the nodes (suh as having a ommon referene to
time or a ommon event for triggering initialization).
For ease of following the arguments and proofs, the struture and logi of our ss-Byz-Agree proe-
dure is modeled on that of [14℄. The rounds in that protool progress following elapsed time. Eah round
spans a onstant predened time interval. Our protool, besides being self-stabilizing, has the additional
advantage of having a message-driven rounds struture and not time-driven rounds struture. Thus the
atual time for terminating the protool depends on the atual ommuniation network speed and not on
the worst possible bound on message delivery time.
It is important to note that we have previously presented a distributed self-stabilizing Byzantine pulse
synhronization proedure in [3℄. It aims at delivering a ommon anhor in time to all orret nodes
within a short time following transient failures and with the permanent presene of Byzantine nodes.
We have also previously presented a protool for making any Byzantine algorithm be self-stabilizing [5℄,
assuming the existene of synhronized pulses. Byzantine agreement an easily be ahieved using a pulse
synhronization proedure: the pulse invoation an serve as the initialization event for round zero of the
agreement protool. Thus any existing Byzantine agreement protool may be used, on top of the pulse
synhronization proedure, to attain self-stabilizing Byzantine agreement. The urrent paper ahieves
Byzantine agreement without assuming synhronized pulses. Moreover, we show in [6℄ that synhronized
pulses an atually be produed more eiently atop the protool in the urrent paper. This pulse
synhronization proedure an in turn be used as the pulse synhronization mehanism for making any
Byzantine algorithm self-stabilize, in a more eient way and in a more general model than by using the
pulse synhronization proedure in [3℄.
An early version of the results overed in the urrent paper appeared in [7℄. The urrent paper provides
elaborated proofs and orret some mistakes that appear in the early version.
In [15℄ it is shown how to initialize Byzantine lok synhronization without assuming a ommon initial-
ization phase. It an eventually also exeute synhronized Byzantine agreement by using the synhronized
loks. The solution is not self-stabilizing as nodes are booted and thus do not initialize with arbitrary
3
values in the memory.
In [11℄ onsensus is reahed assuming eventual synhrony. Following an unstable period with unbounded
failures and message delays, eventually no node fails and messages are delivered within bounded, say d,
time. At this point there is no synhrony among the orret nodes and they might hold opies of obsolete
messages. This is seemingly similar to our model but the solution is not truly self-stabilizing sine the
nodes do not initialize with arbitrary values. Furthermore, the solution only tolerates stopping failures
and no new nodes fail subsequent to stabilization. Consensus is reahed within O(d). That paper also
argues that in their model, although with Byzantine failures, onsensus annot be reahed within less than
O(f ′) ·d time, whih is essentially idential to our time omplexity. Our solution operates in a more severe
fault model and thus onverges in linear time.
2 Model and Problem Denition
The environment is a network of n nodes that ommuniate by exhanging messages. We assume that the
message passing medium allows for an authentiated identity of the senders. The ommuniation network
does not guarantee any order on messages among dierent nodes, though, when the network is funtioning
orretly, any message sent will eventually be delivered. Individual nodes have no aess to a entral lok
and there is no external pulse system. The hardware lok rate (referred to as the physial timers) at eah
non-faulty node has a bounded drift, ρ, from real-time rate. Ensuant to transient failures there an be an
unbounded number of onurrent faulty nodes, the turnover rate between faulty and non-faulty nodes an
be arbitrarily large and the ommuniation network may behave arbitrarily.
Denition 1. A node is non-faulty at times that it omplies with the following:
1. (Bounded Drift) Obeys a global onstant 0 < ρ < 1 (typially ρ ≈ 10−6), suh that for every
real-time interval [u, v] :
(1− ρ)(v − u) ≤ `physial timer'(v)− `physial timer'(u) ≤ (1 + ρ)(v − u).
2. (Obediene) Operates aording to the instruted protool.
3. (Bounded Proessing Time) Proesses any message of the instruted protool within pi real-time
units of arrival time.
1
A node is onsidered faulty if it violates any of the above onditions. A faulty node may reover
from its Byzantine behavior one it resumes obeying the onditions of a non-faulty node. In order to keep
the denitions onsistent, the orretion is not immediate but rather takes a ertain amount of time
during whih the non-faulty node is still not ounted as a orret node, although it supposedly behaves
orretly.
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We later speify the time-length of ontinuous non-faulty behavior required of a reovering
node to be onsidered orret.
Denition 2. The ommuniation network is non-faulty at periods that it omplies with the following:
1
We assume that the bounds inlude also the overhead of the operating system in sending and proessing of messages.
2
For example, a node may reover with arbitrary variables, whih may violate the validity ondition if onsidered orret
immediately.
4
1. Any message arrives at its destination node within δ real-time units;
2. The sender's identity and the ontent of any message being reeived is not tampered.
Thus, our ommuniation network model is a bounded-delay ommuniation network. We do not
assume the existene of a broadast medium. We assume that the network annot store old messages for
arbitrary long time or lose any more messages, one it beomes non-faulty.
3
We use the notation d ≡ (δ + pi) × (1 + ρ). Thus, when the ommuniation network is non-faulty,
d is the upper bound on the elapsed time from the sending of a message by a non-faulty node until it is
reeived and proessed by every non-faulty node, as measured by the loal lok at any non-faulty node.
4
Note that n, f and d are xed onstants and thus non-faulty nodes do not initialize with arbitrary
values of these onstants.
A reovering node should be onsidered orret only one it has been ontinuously non-faulty for
enough time to enable it to have deleted old or spurious messages and to have exhanged information with
the other nodes.
Denition 3. The ommuniation network is orret following ∆
net
real-time of ontinuous non-faulty
behavior.
5
Denition 4. A node is orret following ∆
node
real-time of ontinuous non-faulty behavior during a
period that the ommuniation network is orret.
6
Denition 5. (System Coherene) The system is said to be oherent at times that it omplies with the
following:
• (Quorum) There are at least n − f orret nodes,7 where f is the upper bound on the number of
potentially non-orret nodes at steady state.
Hene, when the system is not oherent, there an be an unbounded number of onurrent faulty nodes;
the turnover rate between the faulty and non-faulty nodes an be arbitrarily large and the ommuniation
network may deliver messages with unbounded delays, if at all. The system is onsidered oherent, one
the ommuniation network and a suient fration of the nodes have been non-faulty for a suiently
long time period for the pre-onditions for onvergene of the protool to hold. The assumption in this
paper, as underlies any other self-stabilizing algorithm, is that the system eventually beomes oherent.
Denition 6. (System Convergene) The system is said to be stable at times that it omplies with the
following:
• (onverging) The system has been oherent for ∆
stb
time units;
8
3
A non-faulty network might fail to deliver messages within the bound but will be masked as a fault and aounted for
in the f faults. Essentially, we assume that messages among orret nodes are delivered within the time bounds.
4
Nodes that were not faulty when the message was sent.
5
We assume ∆
net
≥ d.
6 ∆
node
is dened in the next setion
7
The ondition an be replaed by (n+ f)/2 orret nodes with some modiations to the struture of the protool.
8
We dene ∆
stb
in the next setion.
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• (stability) The system remained oherent sine that time.
It is assumed that eah node has a loal timer that proeeds at the rate of real-time. The atual
reading of the various timers may be arbitrarily apart, but their relative rate is bounded in our model. To
distinguish between a real-time value and a node's loal-time reading we use t for the former and τ for
the latter. The funtion rt(τp) represents the real-time when the timer of a non-faulty node p reads (or
read) τp at the urrent exeution.
Observe that the loal time at a node may wrap around, sine we assume transient faults. The protool
and the primitives presented below require measuring only intervals of times. It is assumed that the loal
time wrap around is larger than a onstant fator of the maximal interval of time need to be measured.
This way a node an uniquily measure any neessary intervals of time.
Sine nodes measure only intervals of time that span several d, and d itself inludes a worst ase drift
fator, by denition, then d is an upper bound on the time it takes to send and proess messages among
orret nodes, measured by eah loal timer, i.e., inluding the drift fator.
3 The ss-Byz-Agree protool
We onsider the Byzantine agreement problem in whih a General broadasts a value and the orret nodes
agree on the value broadasted. In our model any node an be a General. An instane of the protool
is exeuted per General, and a orret General is expeted to send one value at a time.
9
The target is
for the orret nodes to assoiate a loal-time with the protool initiation by the General and to agree on
a spei value assoiated with that initiation, if they agree that suh an initiation atually took plae.
There is a bound on how frequent a orret General may initiate agreements, though Byzantine nodes
might try to trigger agreements on their values at an arbitrary rate.
The ss-Byz-Agree protool is omposed of the Agreement proedure (the main body of the protool)
and two primitives: the primitive Initiator-Aept and the msgd-broadast one (as detailed later).
The General, G, initiates an agreement on a value m by disseminating the message (Initiator,G,m) to
all nodes. Upon reeiving the General's message, eah node invokes the ss-Byz-Agree protool, whih
in turn invokes the primitive Initiator-Aept. Alternatively, if a orret node did not reeive the
General's message but onludes that enough nodes have invoked the protool (or the primitive) it will
partiipate by exeuting the appropriate parts of the primitive Initiator-Aept (but will not invoke
it), and following the ompletion of the primitive that node may partiipate in the orresponding parts of
the agreement proedure.
We will prove the following properties of the ss-Byz-Agree protool. When the system is stable,
if all orret nodes invoke the protool within a small time-window, as will happen if the General is a
orret node, then it is ensured that the orret nodes agree on a value for the General. If the General is
a orret node, the agreed value will be the value sent by the General. When not all orret nodes happen
to invoke the ss-Byz-Agree protool within a small time-window, as an happen if the General is faulty,
then if any orret node aepts a non-null value, all orret nodes will aept and agree on that value.
9
One an expand the protool to a number of onurrent invoations by using an index to dierentiate among the
onurrent invoations.
6
Protool ss-Byz-Agree on (G,m) /* Exeuted at node q. τq is the loal-time
at q. */
/* Blok Q is exeuted only when (and if) invoked. */
/* The rest is exeuted following a setting of a value to τGq . */
/* At most one of bloks R through U is exeuted per suh a setting of τGq .
*/
Q0. If q = G then send (Initiator, G,m) to all . /* initiation of the
primitive by the leader */
Q1. If reeived (Initiator, G,m) invoke Initiator-Aept(G,m).
/* determines τGq and a value m
′
for node G */
R1. if I-aept 〈G,m′, τGq 〉 and τq − τ
G
q ≤ 4d then
R2. value := 〈G,m′〉;
R3. msgd-broadast(q, value, 1);
R4. stop and return 〈value, τGq 〉.
S1. if by τq , τq ≤ τ
G
q + (2r + 1) · Φ,
aepted r distint messages (pi, 〈G,m
′′〉, i), 1 ≤ i ≤ r,
where ∀i, j 1 ≤ i, j ≤ r and pi 6= pj 6= G, then
S2. value := 〈G,m′′〉;
S3. msgd-broadast(q, value, r + 1);
S4. stop and return 〈value, τGq 〉.
T1. if by τq , τq > τ
G
q + (2r + 1) · Φ, |broadcasters| < r − 1 then
T2. stop and return 〈⊥, τGq 〉.
U1. if τq > τ
G
q + (2f + 1) · Φ then
U2. stop and return 〈⊥, τGq 〉.
leanup:
 Erase any value or message older than (2f + 1) · Φ + 3d time units.
 3d after returning a value reset Initiator-Aept, τGq , and
msgd-broadast.
Figure 1: The ss-Byz-Agree protool
For ease of following the arguments and the logi of our ss-Byz-Agree protool, we hose to follow
the building-blok struture of [14℄. The primitive msgd-broadast, presented in Setion 5, replaes
the broadast primitive that simulates authentiation in [14℄. The main dierenes between the original
synhronous broadast primitive and msgd-broadast are two-folds: rst, the latter exeutes rounds
that are anhored at some agreed event whose loal-time is supplied to the primitive through a parameter;
seond, the onditions to be satised at eah round at the latter need to be satised by some time span
that is a funtion of the round number and need not be exeuted only during the round itself. This allows
nodes to rush through the protool in the typial ase when messages among orret nodes happen to be
delivered faster than the worse ase round span.
The ss-Byz-Agree protool needs to take into onsideration that orret nodes may invoke the
agreement proedure at arbitrary times and with no knowledge as to when other orret nodes may have
invoked the proedure. A mehanism is thus needed to make all orret nodes attain some ommon notion
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as to when the General may have sent a value, and what that value is. The dierenes of the real-time
representations of the dierent nodes' estimations should be bounded. This mehanism is satised by the
primitive Initiator-Aept, presented in Setion 4. The use of this initial step in the protool provides
the nodes with an initial potential value of the General, and as a result number of rounds neessary to
reah agreement is two less than those of [14℄.
We use the following notations in the desription of the agreement proedure and the related primitives:
• Let Φ be the duration of time equal to (τGskew+2d) loal-time units on a orret node's timer, where
τGskew = 6d in the ontext of this paper. Intuitively, Φ is the duration of a phase on a orret
node's timer.
• ∆
agr
, the upper bound on the time it takes to run the agreement protool, will be equal to (2f+1)·Φ.
• ∆0 = 13d, the minimal time between onseutive invoations of the protool by the General, for
dierent values.
• ∆
rmv
= (∆
agr
+∆0), the time after whih old values are deayed.
• ∆
v
= (15d+2∆
rmv
), the minimal time between two invoations of the protool by the General, for
the same value.
• ∆
node
= ∆
v
+∆
agr
, the time it takes for a non-faulty node to be onsidered orret.
• ∆
reset
= 20d + 4∆
rmv
, the time during whih the General sends nothing, when it noties a failure
in agreeing on a value it sent.
• ∆
stb
= 2∆
reset
, stabilization time of the system.
• ⊥ denotes a null value.
• In the primitive Initiator-Aept:
 An I-aept
10
is issued on values sent by G.
 τGq denotes the loal-time estimate, at node q, as to when the General has sent the value
assoiated with the I-aept by node q.
In the ontext of this paper we assume that a orret General onform with the following riteria when
sending its messages.
Sending Validity Criteria: A non-faulty General G sends (Initiator, G,m) provided that:
[IG1℄ At least ∆0 time passed from the sending of the previous initiation message by G.
[IG2℄ At least ∆
v
time passed from the sending of previous initiation message with the same value m by
G.
Notie that both limitations an be irumvented by adding ounters to onurrent agreement initia-
tions. The dierene between the two ases has to do with the ability to onverge from an arbitrary initial
state. If a node an send the same message again and again repeatedly, there is a way for the adversary
to onfuse of onvergene protool, as an be seen in the next setion.
10
An aept is issued within msgd-broadast.
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Denition 7. We say:
• A node p deides at time τ if it stops at that loal-time and returns value 6=⊥ .
• A node p aborts if it stops and returns ⊥ .
• A node p returns a value if it either aborts or deides.
The ss-Byz-Agree protool is presented (see Figure 1) in a somewhat dierent style than the original
protool in [14℄. Eah round has a preondition assoiated with it: if the loal timer value assoiated with
the initialization by the General is dened and the preondition holds then the step is to be exeuted. It
is assumed that the primitives' instanes invoked as a result of the ss-Byz-Agree protool are impliitly
assoiated with the agreement instane that invoked them. A node stops partiipating in the proedures
one it returns a value and it stopped partiipating in the invoked primitives 3d time units after that.
We use the term partiipate to refer to a node that exeutes the protool's (and primitives') steps. The
term invoke will refer to a node that also exeutes the rst blok of the protool (Blok Q) or primitive
(Blok K), as eah orret node would do if the General is a orret one. A node aumulates messages
assoiated with the protool even before it invokes it or partiipates in it. Suh messages are deayed if
the node doesn't invoke or partiipate in the protool, or being proessed one it does.
The ss-Byz-Agree protool satises the following typial properties, provided that the system is
stable:
Agreement: If any onnet node deides (G,m), all orret nodes deide the same;
Validity: If the General invokes ss-Byz-Agree then eah orret node deides on the value sent by G;
Termination: The protool terminates in a nite time.
Note that in light of our denitions, the Agreement property atually says that if the protool returns
a value 6=⊥ at any orret node, it returns the same value at all orret nodes.
The ss-Byz-Agree protool also satises the following timing properties:
Timeliness:
1. (agreement) If a orret node q deides on (G,m) at τq then any orret node q
′
deides on (G,m)
at some τq′ suh that,
(a) |rt(τq)− rt(τq′)| ≤ 3d, and if validity holds, then |rt(τq)− rt(τq′)| ≤ 2d;
(b) |rt(τGq )− rt(τ
G
q′ )| ≤ 6d;
() rt(τGq ), rt(τ
G
q′ ) ∈ [t1 − 2d, t2], where [t1, t2] is the interval within whih eah orret node, p,
that obtained the τGp appearing in (b) following the invoation of ss-Byz-Agree (G,m), did
so;
(d) rt(τGq ) ≤ rt(τq) and rt(τq)− rt(τ
G
q ) ≤ ∆agr.
2. (validity) If all orret nodes invoked the protool in an interval [t0, t0+d], as a result of some value
m sent by a orret General G that onform with the Sending Validity Criteria, then for every orret
node q, the deision time τq, satises t0 − d ≤ rt(τ
G
q ) ≤ rt(τq) ≤ t0 + 4d.
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3. (termination) The protool terminates within ∆
agr
time units of invoation, and within ∆
agr
+ 7d
in ase it was not invoked expliitly.
4. (separation) Let p and q be two orret nodes that deided on agreements regarding G, then
(a) for m 6= m′, |rt(τGq )− rt(τ
G
p )| > 4d;
(b) for m = m′, either |rt(τGq )− rt(τ
G
p )| ≤ 6d or |rt(τ
G
q )− rt(τ
G
p )| > 2∆rmv − 3d
Note that the bounds in the above property is with respet to d, the bound on message transmission
time among orret nodes and not the worse ase deviation represented by Φ.
Observe that sine there is no prior notion of the possibility that a value may be sent, it might be that
some nodes assoiate a ⊥ with a faulty sending and others may not notie the sending at all.
The proof that the ss-Byz-Agree protool meets its properties appears in Setion 6.3.
4 The primitive Initiator-Aept
In a typial agreement protool a General that wants to send some value broadasts it in a spei round
(say the rst round of the protool). From the assumptions on synhrony all orret nodes an hek
whether a value was indeed sent at the speied round and whether multiple (faulty) values were sent. In
the transient fault model no suh round number an be set beforehand adjoined with the broadast. Thus
a faulty General has more power in trying to fool the orret nodes by sending its values at ompletely
dierent times to whihever nodes it hooses.
The primitive Initiator-Aept aims at making the orret nodes assoiate a loal time with the
invoation of the protool (and primitive) by (the possibly faulty) General, and to onverge to a single
andidate value for the agreement to ome. Sine the full invoation of the protool by a faulty General
might be questionable, there may be ases in whih some orret nodes will return a ⊥ value and others
will not identify the invoation as valid. But, as we will prove, if any orret node happens to return a
value 6=⊥ within a given timeframe, all orret nodes will return the same value.
In order to initiate the proess of broadasting its value (one value at a time) the General sends
(Initiator, G,m) to all nodes, provided some validity riteria are met, as we detail below. As a re-
sponse to that initiation message, eah non-faulty node (inluding the General) invokes the primitive
Initiator-Aept. Eah node dynamially exeutes the primitive, whenever relevant messages are be-
ing reeived, to obtain an estimate to its (relative) loal-time at whih the primitive may have been initiated.
The primitive guarantees that all orret nodes' estimates are within some bounded real-time of eah other.
To ensure onvergene we need to add to the two Sending Validity Criteria of Setion 3 a third one:
[IG3℄ No invoation of Initiator-Aept (G, ∗) failed in the last ∆
reset
time, where an invoa-
tion is onsidered failed if any of the following is failed: exeuting lines L4, M4 or N4 of the
Initiator-Aept primitive (see Figure 2) is not ompleted within 2d, 3d or 4d of the invoa-
tion, respetively.
The General, before initiating the primitive, removes from its memory all previously reeived messages
assoiated with any previous invoation of the primitive with him as a General.
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Primitive Initiator-Aept (G,m) /* Exeuted at node q. τq is the loal-time at q.
*/
/* Blok K is exeuted only when (and if) the primitive is expliitly invoked. */
/* Lines L1 through N3 are repeatedly exeuted upon reeiving messages. */
K1. if i_values[G,m′] =⊥ for every m′ 6= m & lastq(G) = ⊥ &
did not send any (support,G, ∗) in [τq − d, τq] & /* allow for reent messages */
lastq(G,m) = ⊥ at τq − d then
K2. i_values[G,m] := τq − d; /* reording time */
send (support,G,m) to all; lastq(G,m) = τq;
L1. if reeived (support,G,m) from ≥ n− 2f distint nodes
in the interval [τq − α, τq ] for α ≤ 4d then /* shortest interval */
L2. i_values[G,m] := max{i_values[G,m], (τq − α− 2d)}; lastq(G,m) = τq; /* reording
time */
L3. if reeived (support,G,m) from ≥ n− f distint nodes
in the interval [τq − 2d, τq ] then
L4. send (approve,G,m) to all; lastq(G,m) = τq; /* if not reently sent */
M1. if reeived (approve,G,m) from ≥ n− 2f distint nodes
in the interval [τq − 5d, τq ] then
M2. ready
G,m
=`true'; lastq(G,m) = τq;
M3. if reeived (approve,G,m) from ≥ n− f distint nodes
in the interval [τq − 3d, τq ] then
M4. send (ready,G,m) to all; lastq(G,m) = τq;
N1. if ready
G,m
& reeived (ready,G,m) from ≥ n− 2f distint nodes then
N2. send (ready,G,m) to all; lastq(G,m) = τq;
N3. if ready
G,m
& reeived (ready,G,m) from ≥ n− f distint nodes then
N4. τGq := i_values[G,m]; i_values[G, ∗] := ⊥;
remove all (G,m) messages and ignore all (G,m) messages for 3d;
I-aept 〈G,m, τGq 〉; lastq(G,m) = τq; lastq(G) := τq.
leanup:
Remove any value or message that is older than ∆
rmv
time units;
If lastq(G) > τq or lastq(G) < τq − (∆0 − 6d) then lastq(G) :=⊥ .
If lastq(G,m) > τq or lastq(G,m) < τq − (2∆rmv + 9d) then lastq(G,m) :=⊥ .
Figure 2: The primitive Initiator-Aept
Eah orret node reords the loal-time at whih it reeives eah message assoiated with the invo-
ation of the primitive, for the spei General. Whenever a new message arrives the node reords it and
its time of arrival. The node goes through the primitive and onsiders all the various lines of the primitive,
one by one, and ats aordingly. Notie that the node proesses all messages, even if it did not invoke
the primitive.
We say that a node does an I-aept of a value sent by the General if it aepts this value as the
General's initial value, and τGq is the estimated loal-time at q assoiated with the initiation of the primitive
by the General.
Eah node maintains a list i_values[G, ∗] for the possible onurrent values sent by the General G,
where eah non-empty entry is a loal-time assoiated with the possible invoation of the primitive with
that entry value. The list should ontain at most a single value if the General it orret. Eah node also
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maintains for eah non empty entry a time variable, last(G,m), that indiates the latest time at whih
any stage of the primitive was exeuted regarding the spei value m. To ensure the ompliane of the
General with the rules of initiating the primitive eah node also maintains an additional time variable,
last(G), measuring the minimal time between two onseutive invoations of the primitive by the General.
Eah entry has an expiration time, and messages have a deay time, so after some time all residue
of previous invoations are removed. The variables are set to ⊥ as a result of resetting them. The
Initiator-Aept primitive requires the knowledge of the state of the vetor i_values[G, ∗] d time
units in the past. It is assumed that the data struture reets that information.
Denition 8. The data struture of a node is fresh with respet to a value m if d units of time ago
i_values[G, ∗] did not ontain any value and the time variables last(G,m), and last(G) both were ⊥.
Thus, as we prove later on, when the data struture is fresh and a orret node reeives an initiation
message form a orret G it will be able to exeute suessfully Blok K of the Initiator-Aept
primitive.
Before stating the properties that the primitive Initiator-Aept satises we give some intuition
regarding it. The primitive is omposed of ve setions: four of them are ommands to exeute in response
of reeiving messages and the nal one is a leanup proess that is arried on in the bakground.
Blok K states the rules for the invoation of the primitive. It is exeuted as a result of reeiving a
(Initiator, G,m) message from G.
Line K1 lists the tests a node arries to ensure that G respets the Sending Validity Criteria. The nodes
tests whether any other broadasts of messages were proessed not too long ago. Sine the message from
G may take d to arrive, and responses to suh a message from other orret nodes may have been reeived
already. Therefore the node heks what was the status of its data struture d time units ago. It heks
whether it reently responded to any initiation message or whether it proessed the relevant message from
other nodes only in the last d units of time.
Line K2: the node sends its support message to all nodes, and marks the time of sending. The sending
event entry is marked as a time prior to the invoation of the primitive, therefore d is redued.
Blok L intends to apture the fat that enough orret nodes have sent the support messages within
a short period of one another. If that happens an approved message is being produed.
Line L1: The node tests whether at least one orret node has invoked the primitive in the last 4d
time units.
Line L2: The node marks that latest suh event. The node redues 2d to mark a time prior to an
invoation event would G was a orret node.
Line L3: The node heks whether at least t + 1 orret nodes have sent support within d of eah
other. Notie that sine some messages may take 0 time to arrive and some may take d the interval is 2d.
Notie also that if at some orret node this is true, at all orret nodes the test of Line L1 is true.
Line L4: Sine the node knows that every orret node will end up exeuting Line L2, and d after that
all will have Line L3 enabled, it is safe to send an approve message.
The general ontrols the previous bloks be deiding when to send the invoation messages to whih
orret node. We now moved to two stages that are ontrolled by the orret nodes that send the approval
messages, and there is a need to prevent transient messages that may happen to be in the memory of the
orret nodes from separating the agreement among orret nodes.
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Blok M intends to verify that all orret nodes have moved a stage before we move to the aeptane
stage. If enough orret have sent approve within a small time window a ready message will be produed.
Line M1: The node tests whether at least one orret node has sent a reent approve.
Line M2: In suh a ase, the orret node marks that by setting the ready variable, whih will mark
its potential readiness to move to the nal stage and to to join others in Line N2.
Line M3: The node heks whether every orret node will notie the sending of an approve message.
Line M4: In suh a ase the node sends a ready message and move to the nal stage.
Blok N is the only blok that is not timed by a short interval, in order to enable nodes that may be
initial spread around to ollet their ations. If enough have notied the readiness to aept the message
by the general, all will.
Line N1: The node tests whether at least one orret node has sent a ready message and whether it
is ready to move to the nal stage.
Line N2: In suh a ase, the orret node amplies the sending and sends its own ready message.
Line M3: The node heks whether every orret node will notie the sending of ready messages.
Line M4: in suh a ase the node set the potential time of the invoation of the protools by G and
aepts the sending. In order to prevent reurrene aepting the node lear messages and ignore messages
for a short time period.
Blok Cleanup has three parts. Any message that is too old is removed. The other two parts rest the
two variables that measure the elapse time between two onseutive invoations of the same value and
of dierent values. The reason that the expiration of lastq(G,m) is almost twie ∆rmv is to separate
onseutive sending of the same value from the possible transient messages at startup.
Reall that a node is required to keep time stamps assoiated with the various entries in its data
strutures and the messages it has reeived. Eah time-stamped entry that is learly wrong, with respet
to the urrent lok reading of τq, is removed; i.e., future time stamps or too old time stamps.
The primitive Initiator-Aept satises the following properties, provided that the system is stable:
[IA-1℄ (Corretness) If a orret General G invokes Initiator-Aept (G,m) at t0 then:
[1A℄ All orret nodes I-aept 〈G,m, τG〉 within 4d time units of the invoation;
[1B℄ All orret nodes I-aept 〈G,m, τG〉 within 2d time units of eah other;
[1C℄ For every pair of orret nodes q and q′ that I-aepts 〈G,m, τGq 〉 and 〈G,m, τ
G
q′ 〉, respetively:
|rt(τGq′ )− rt(τ
G
q )| ≤ d ;
[1D℄ For eah orret node q that I-aepts 〈G,m, τGq 〉 at τq, t0 − d ≤ rt(τ
G
q ) ≤ rt(τq) ≤ t0 + 4d.
[IA-2℄ (Unforgeability) If no orret node invokes Initiator-Aept (G,m), then no orret node
I-aepts 〈G,m, τG〉.
[IA-3℄ (∆
agr
-Relay) If a orret node q I-aepts 〈G,m, τGq 〉 at real-time t, suh that t− rt(τ
G
q ) ≤ ∆agr,
then:
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[3A℄ Every orret node q′ I-aepts 〈G,m, τGq′ 〉, at some real-time t
′, with |t− t′| ≤ 2d and
|rt(τGq )− rt(τ
G
q′ )| ≤ 6d ;
[3B℄ Moreover, for every orret node q′, rt(τGq′ ) ≤ t2, where some orret node invoked the primitive
Initiator-Aept at t2;
[3C℄ For every orret node q′, rt(τGq′ ) ≤ rt(τq′) and rt(τq′)− rt(τ
G
q′ ) ≤ ∆agr + 8d.
[IA-4℄ (Uniqueness) If a orret node q I-aepts 〈G,m, τGq 〉, and a orret node I-aepts 〈G,m
′, τGp 〉,
then
[4A℄ for m 6= m′, |rt(τGq )− rt(τ
G
p )| > 4d;
[4b℄ for m = m′, either |rt(τGq )− rt(τ
G
p )| ≤ 6d or |rt(τ
G
q )− rt(τ
G
p )| > 2∆rmv − 3d.
When the primitive is invoked the node exeutes Blok K. A node may reeive messages related to the
primitive, even in ase that it did not invoke the primitive. In this ase it exeutes the rest of the bloks
of the primitive, if the appropriate preonditions hold. A orret node repeatedly exeutes eah line until
it exeute Line N4. So we assume that a node may send the same message several times. We ignore
possible optimizations that an save suh repetitive sending of messages. One a node exeutes Line N4
it removes all assoiated messages and ignores related messages for some time, so Line-N4 is not exeuted
more than one per exeution of the primitive.
Notie that sine Blok N is not timed, its expiration is determined by the expiration of old messages,
whih leads to the denition of ∆
rmv
. and ∆
v
. Following the ompletion of ss-Byz-Agree, the data
strutures of the related Initiator-Aept instane are reset.
The proof that the Initiator-Aept primitive satises the [IA-*℄ properties, under the assumption
that n > 3f, appears in Setion 6.1. The proofs also show that from any initial state, after ∆
stb
the
system beomes stable.
5 The msgd-broadast Primitive
This setion presents the msgd-broadast (a message driven broadast) primitive, whih aepts
messages being broadasted. The primitive is invoked within the ss-Byz-Agree protool presented in
Setion 3. The primitive follows the broadast primitive of Toueg, Perry, and Srikanth [14℄. In the original
synhronous model, nodes advane aording to rounds that are divided into phases. This intuitive lok-
step proess laries the presentation and simplies the proofs. Here the primitive msgd-broadast is
presented without any expliit or impliit referene to absolute time or round number, rather an anhor
to the potential initialization point of the protool is passed as a parameter by the alling proedure. The
properties of the Initiator-Aept primitive guarantee a bound between the real-time of the anhors of
the orret nodes. Thus a general notion of a ommon round struture an be implemented by measuring
the time elapsed sine the anhor.
In the broadast primitive of [14℄ messages assoiated with a ertain round must be sent by orret
nodes at that round and will be reeived, the latest, at the end of that round by all orret nodes. In
msgd-broadast, on the other hand, the rounds progress with the arrival of the antiipated messages.
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Primitive msgd-broadast (p,m, k)
/* Exeuted per suh triplet at node q. */
/* Nodes send speifi messages only one. */
/* Nodes exeute the bloks only when τG is defined. */
/* Nodes log messages until they are able to proess them. */
/* Multiple messages sent by an individual node are ignored. */
At node q = p: /* if node q is node p that invoked the primitive */
V. node p sends (init, p,m, k) to all nodes;
W1. At time τq : τq ≤ τ
G
q + 2k · Φ
W2. if reeived (init, p,m, k) from p then
W3. send (echo, p,m, k) to all;
X1. At time τq : τq ≤ τ
G
q + (2k + 1) · Φ
X2. if reeived (echo, p,m, k) from ≥ n− 2f distint nodes then
X3. send (init′, p,m, k) to all;
X4. if reeived (echo, p,m, k) messages from ≥ n− f distint nodes then
X5. aept (p,m, k);
Y1. At time τq : τq ≤ τ
G
q + (2k + 2) · Φ
Y2. if reeived (init′, p,m, k) from ≥ n− 2f then
Y3. broadcasters := broadcasters∪ {p};
Y4. if reeived (init′, p,m, k) from ≥ n− f distint nodes then
Y5. send (echo′, p,m, k) to all;
Z1. At any time:
Z2. if reeived (echo′, p,m, k) from ≥ n− 2f distint nodes then
Z3. send (echo′, p,m, k) to all;
Z4. if reeived (echo′, p,m, k) from ≥ n− f distint nodes then
Z5. aept (p,m, k); /* aept only one */
leanup:
Remove any value or message older than (2f + 3) · Φ time units.
Figure 3: The msgd-broadast primitive with message-driven round struture
Thus for example, if a node reeives some required messages before the end of the round it may send next
round's messages. The length of a round only imposes an upper bound on the aeptane riteria. Thus
the protool an progress at the speed of message delivery, whih may be signiantly faster than that of
the protool in [14℄.
Note that when a node invokes the primitive it evaluates all the messages in its buer that are relevant
to the primitive. The msgd-broadast primitive is exeuted in the ontext of some initiator G that
invoked ss-Byz-Agree, whih makes use of the msgd-broadast primitive. No orret node will
exeute the msgd-broadast primitive without rst produing the referene (anhor), τG, on its loal
timer to the time estimate at whih G supposedly invoked the original agreement. By IA-3A this happens
within 6d of the other orret nodes.
The synhronous Reliable Broadast proedure of [14℄ assumes a round model in whih within eah
phase all message exhange among orret nodes take plae. The equivalent notion of a round in our
ontext will be Φ dened to be: Φ := tG
skew
+ 2d.
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The msgd-broadast primitive satises the following [TPS-*℄ properties of Toueg, Perry and
Srikanth [14℄, whih are phrased in our system model.
TPS-1 (Corretness) If a orret node p msgd-broadast (p,m, k) at τp, where τp ≤ τ
G
p +(2k− 1) ·Φ,
on its timer, then eah orret node q aepts (p,m, k) at some τq, τq ≤ τ
G
q + (2k + 1) · Φ, on its
timer and |rt(τp)− rt(τq)| ≤ 3d.
TPS-2 (Unforgeability) If a orret node p does not msgd-broadast (p,m, k), then no orret node
aepts (p,m, k).
TPS-3 (Relay) If a orret node q1 aepts (p,m, k) at τ1, τ1 ≤ τ
G
1
+ r · Φ on its timer then any other
orret node q2 aepts (p,m, k) at some τ2, τ2 ≤ τ
G
2
+ (r + 2) · Φ, on its timer.
TPS-4 (Detetion of broadasters) If a orret node aepts (p,m, k) then every orret node q has p ∈
broadcasters at some τq, τq ≤ τ
G
q + (2k + 2) · Φ, on its timer. Furthermore, if a orret node p
does not msgd-broadast any message, then a orret node an never have p ∈ broadcasters.
Note that the bounds in [TPS-1℄ are with respet to d, the bound on message transmission time among
orret nodes.
When the system is stable, the msgd-broadast primitive satises the [TPS-*℄ properties, under the
assumption that n > 3f. The proofs that appear in Setion 6.2 follow losely the original proofs of [14℄,
in order to make it easier for readers that are familiar with the original proofs.
6 Proofs
Note that all the denitions, theorems and lemmata in this paper hold only from the moment, and as long
as, the system is stable.
6.1 Proof of the Initiator-Aept Properties
In the proof we distinguish between the initiation of the primitive Initiator-Aept by the General that
is done by sending (Initiator, G,m) to all nodes, and the invoation of the primitive Initiator-Aept
by the non-faulty nodes as a result of reeiving the above message. Notie that the General himself plays
a double role; it also invokes the primitive.
Nodes ontinuously run the primitive, in the sense that for eah inoming message the various if
statements are tested. We say that a node exeutes a line in the ode when the appropriate if ondition
holds. In the proofs below, we omit the referene to (G,m) when it is lear from the ontext. Thus, when
we refer to a node exeuting a line it is assumed that it is with (G,m) and that the if ondition holds.
Claim 1. If a orret General G doesn't initiate Initiator-Aept in an interval [t¯−∆
reset
, t¯) then,
1. at t¯ when G initiates the primitive Initiator-Aept with m, all orret nodes will exeute
suessfully Line K1 and will send (support,G,m) in the interval [t¯, t¯+ d];
2. by t¯+ 4d all orret nodes will exeute Line N4, within 2d of eah other;
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3. at any t′ ≥ t¯, if the orret G initiates its Initiator-Aept with value m′ and G did not initiate
any Initiator-Aept in the interval [t′−∆0, t
′) and G did not initiate any Initiator-Aept
with m′ in the interval [t′ −∆
v
, t′) then all orret nodes will exeute suessfully Line K1 and will
send (support,G,m′) in the interval [t′, t′+d], and by t′+4d all orret nodes will exeute Line N4,
within 2d of eah other.
Proof. Notie that (support,G,m) messages are sent only as a result of reeiving the initiation message
from the General. Reall that ∆
v
= 15d+2∆
rmv
and ∆
reset
= 20d+4∆
rmv
. Dene t = t¯−20d−4∆
rmv
.
In the proof we onsider only nodes that are orret from time t on. At t + d some orret nodes may
still end up exeuting (suessfully
11
) Blok K and may end up sending (support,G,m), beause of some
presumably previously reeived messages; but past t + d, by the ode of the primitive, no orret node
would exeute it any more. The last (support,G,m) message resulting from that ativity may reah some
non-faulty node the latest by t+ 2d. For that reason, past t+ 6d, no orret node will exeute Blok L
until a new initiation message will be reeived by some orret node.
The latest (approve,G,m) may be sent by t + 4d and reah others by t + 5d. But past t + 10d,
no orret node will exeute Blok M. Notie that faulty nodes may still inuene some orret nodes to
exeute Blok N and it might be that some and not all orret nodes will follow them.
By t+ 10d +∆
rmv
the variable ready
G,m
(for all possible values of m) will deay at all orret nodes
and none will exeute Blok N or update last(G,m) anymore. By t+ 10d + 2∆
rmv
+ d no orret node
will hold in its memory any message laimed to be sent by a orret node and all variables in all data
strutures, inluding lastq(G), will deay. The variable lastq(G,m) will deay at all orret nodes by
t+ 10d+ 2∆
rmv
+ 2∆
rmv
+ 9d = t+ 19d + 4∆
rmv
= t+∆
reset
− d.
Therefore, if at time t¯ the orret G will initiate Initiator-Aept with any m, all orret nodes
will exeute suessfully Line K1 and will send support within d of eah other, ompleting the proof of
the rst item of the laim.
To prove the seond item of the laim, notie that by t¯+2d all orret nodes will exeute suessfully
Line L4, and by t¯ + 3d all will exeute suessfully both lines M2 and M4. By t¯ + 4d all will exeute
suessfully Line N4. Let q be the rst orret node exeuting Line N4 at some time t1 in this interval,
following its exeution of lines M4 and N3. By t1 + d all will exeute Line N2 and by t1 + 2d all will
exeute Line N4, and will set the value of last(G,m) and lastq(G).
To prove the third item of the laim we will use a mathematial indution on the initiations of
Initiator-Aept past time t¯. Sine the orret G initiates Initiator-Aept sequentially, the
order of initiations is well dened. Let i, i ≥ 0, be the index desribing the order of initiations past time
t¯. Case i = 0 holds by the rst two items of the laim.
Assume that the third item holds for i−1 and prove it for i. Let t be the time at whih the i−1 initiation
started. By the indution hypothesis, and by the ode of the primitive, by t+ 4d+∆0 − 6d < t+∆0 all
will reset lastq(G). Therefore, by t
′
all non-faulty have reset the value of lastq(G). If G did not initiate
Initiator-Aept with m′ after time t′ −∆
v
, then by the proof of the rst item of the laim, all will
exeute Blok K. The ow of the proof of the seond item of the laim ompletes the proof.
Otherwise, let t0, t0 ≥ t¯, be the last time G initiated Initiator-Aept with m
′
. By the indution
hypothesis, by t0 + 4d all non-faulty nodes will exeute Line N4 and by t0 + 4d + 2∆rmv + 9d all would
11
We omit the term suessfully from now on
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have reset last(G,m′). Sine t0 + 4d+ 2∆rmv + 9d < t0 +∆v ≤ t
′
, again, all will exeute Blok K, and
following the arguments of the rst two items, the laim holds.
The proof an be extended to prove the following orollary for non-faulty nodes that beome orret.
Corollary 1. Claim 1 holds for any set of at least n − f − 1 nodes and a General that are all non-faulty
from time t¯−∆
reset
on.
In the proofs below we need to refer to the ohereny of the system and to the minimal time past from
the time the network beomes orret. We denote by ι0 the time by whih the network beomes orret
and there are at least n − f non-faulty nodes that remain non-faulty from that time on. The system is
onsidered stable from time ι1 = ι0 + 2∆reset, and as long as the system remains oherent.
In the rest of this setion, in all the laims and proofs, whenever we refer to a non-faulty node we
imply a non- faulty node that remains non-faulty from time ι0 on.
Lemma 1. One the system is stable, at any time past time ι1, if a orret General G initiates the primitive
Initiator-Aept at some time tˆ, not sooner than ∆0 of the beginning of the previous initiation, and
not sooner than ∆
v
of the last initiation with the the same value m, then within d of the initiation, all
orret nodes will send (support,G,m). Moreover, by tˆ+4d all orret nodes will exeute Line N4, within
2d of eah other.
Proof. Reall that ι0 is the time by whih the network beame orret, as dened above. Before ι0 every
non-faulty node may have arbitrary values in the various variables of Initiator-Aept and some of
the messages being aumulated may be a result of the transient fault.
Past ι0+d all reeived messages laimed to be sent by non-faulty nodes were atually sent by non-faulty
nodes. Observe that messages resulting form the initial arbitrary state may be sent by non-faulty nodes
as a result of their initial state without atually reeiving the required messages, sine suh messages may
be in their initial memory state.
Past ι0 + 6d, whenever a non-faulty nodes onsiders support or approve messages that were re-
eived within the appropriate time intervals in Blok L and Blok M of the primitive it onsiders only
messages from non-faulty nodes that were sent by non-faulty nodes as a result of exeuting the ode of
Initiator-Aept.
Past ι0, if a non-faulty General G doesn't initiate Initiator-Aept in an interval [t, t + ∆reset),
where t+∆
reset
≤ tˆ, by Claim 1 the lemma holds.
Now assume that the non-faulty node G did initiate Initiator-Aept in the interval [ι0, ι0+∆reset).
If during any suh invoation (when exeuting Initiator-Aept as one of the partiipating nodes) G
fails to suessfully exeute either Line L4 within 2d of the invoation, or Line M4 within 3d of the
invoation or Line N4 within 4d of of the invoation, then it will not initiate the primitive for another
∆
reset
, and by Claim 1 the lemma holds.
The only ase that is left is when G did initiate Initiator-Aept in the interval [ι0, ι0+∆reset) =
[ι0, ι0 + 20d+ 4∆rmv) and whenever it does so, it suessfully exeutes Line L4, Line M4, Line N4 within
2d, 3d, and 4d, respetively. Reall that before initiating the primitive a non-faulty General removes all
past messages assoiated with the primitive. Let t¯ > ι0 + d be a time at whih G invoked the primitive.
Therefore, past time t¯, all messages from non-faulty nodes that G reeives, while exeuting the primitive,
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were atually sent by non-faulty nodes. By assumption, by t¯ + 2d G exeutes Line L4, therefore, by the
ode of the primitive, by t¯ + 3d all non-faulty nodes would have i_values[G,m] dened. Similarly, by
t¯+3d G exeute Line M4, therefore by t¯+4d all will have ready
G,m
=`true'. Sine all the (ready,G,m)
messages G aumulates were atually sent past t¯ − d (it may reeive these messages after invoking the
primitive), all non-faulty nodes will reeive at least t + 1 of them by t¯+ 5d, and by t¯+ 6d all non-faulty
nodes will suessfully exeute Line N4.
Let t′ be the rst time, past ι0 + 20d + 4∆rmv, at whih G, as a orret node invokes the primitive
with some m, assuming it didn't do so with that spei m for at least ∆
v
= 15d + 2∆
rmv
, and for any
other m′ for at least ∆0 = 13d. Let t¯ be the last time G invoked the primitive with that spei m. By the
arguments above, by t¯+6d all non-faulty nodes would have set last(G,m), and by t¯+6d+2∆
rmv
+9d ≤ t′
all would have reset it. For similar reasons, if t was the last time prior to t′ at whih G invoked the primitive
with any value, then by t+ 6d all would have exeuted Line N4, and by t+ 6d+∆0 − 6d = t+∆0 < t
′
would have reset the variable lastq(G). Therefore, when eah orret node reeives the invoation it will
send (support,G,m) within d of eah other and by t′ + 4d all non-faulty nodes will exeute Line N4,
within 2d of eah other.
To omplete the proof we use mathematial indution as was done in the proof of Claim 1.
Lemma 1 and the validity riteria of initiating the primitive Initiator-Aept imply the following.
Corollary 2. One the system is stable, whenever a orret General G initiates the Initiator-Aept
with some value m, the data strutures at all orret nodes is fresh.
We now prove some tehnial laims that over the ase of a faulty General.
Claim 2. If a non-faulty node exeutes Line M2 (or Line M4) with some (G,m) at some time t, for
t > ι0 + 10d, then no non-faulty node will exeute Line M2 (or Line M4) with (G,m) at any t
′, t′ ∈
(t+10d, t+2∆
rmv
) and in the interval t′ ∈ (t, t+2∆
rmv
+10d) there is a sub-interval of length at least
2∆
rmv
during whih no non-faulty node exeutes Line M2 (or Line M4) with (G,m).
Proof. A non-faulty node that exeuted Line M2 (or Line M4) with (G,m) at time t has onsidered only
messages sent past ι0 + d and notied at least one message from a non-faulty node, say q, that has sent
(approve,G,m) at some time in the interval [t− 6d, t]. The non-faulty node q sent the (approve,G,m)
message as a result of exeuting Line L4 at some time t′ in the above interval. Sine q have reeived n−f
(support,G,m) messages in the interval [t′ − 2d, t′], every non-faulty node should have notied at least
t + 1 of these in some interval [t′ − 3d, t′ + d] and would have exeuted Line L2 in that interval. This
implies that all non-faulty nodes have set last(G,m) at some time in the interval [t− 9d, t + d]. By the
protool, no non-faulty node will send any (support,G,m) later than t+2d (it allows for reent messages
whih auses it to send its support a d later) until it will reset last(G,m), whih takes 2∆
rmv
+ 9d time.
The earliest this will happen to any non-faulty node is t− 9d+ 2∆
rmv
+ 9d = t+ 2∆
rmv
.
Sine no non-faulty node will send (support,G,m) later than t+ 2d, no non-faulty node will exeute
Line L4 later than t+ 2d+ 2d = t+ 4d, and its message may be reeived by non-faulty nodes by t+ 5d.
Therefore, Line M2 (or M4) may still be exeuted as a result of suh a message as late as t+ 10d. This
implies that no non-faulty node will exeute Line M2 (or M4) in the interval (t+ 10d, t + 2∆
rmv
]. Note
that by denition 2∆
rmv
> 10d.
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Observe that the above arguments imply that if t¯ is the latest time in the interval [t, t+10d] at whih
a non-faulty node exeutes Line M2, then no non-faulty node will exeute Line M2 or Line M4 earlier than
t¯+ 2∆
rmv
, sine eah non-faulty node gas set last(G,m) at t¯− 9d or later.
Corollary 3. If two non-faulty nodes exeute Line M2 with (G,m) at some times t1, t2, respetively, for
t1, t2 > ι0 + 10d, then either |t1 − t2| ≤ 9d or |t1 − t2| > 2∆rmv.
Claim 3. If a non-faulty node exeutes Line M4 with (G,m) at some time t, for t > ι0 + 10d, then
no non-faulty node will exeute Line M4 in the interval [t + 8d, t + 2∆
rmv
+ 5d]; and in the interval
[t, t+2∆
rmv
+6d], there is sub-interval of length 2∆
rmv
during whih no non-faulty node exeutes either
Line M2 or Line M4 with (G,m) .
Proof. A non-faulty node that exeuted Line M4 with (G,m) at time t has onsidered only messages
sent past ι0 + d and notied at least t + 1 message from non-faulty nodes that were sent in the interval
[t− 4d, t]. Eah suh message is a result of reeiving (support,G,m) messages that may have been sent
as early as t− 7d. Thus, all these are based on atual messages being sent past ι0 + d.
Let t be a time at whih a non-faulty node exeute Line M4 with (G,m). By t + d all non-faulty
nodes will set last(G,m). Past t + 2d and until its last(G,m) is reset no non-faulty node will send
(support,G,m). Therefore, no non-faulty node will send (approve,G,m) past t+2d+2d, and none will
exeute Line M4 past t+ 4d+ d+ 3d and until its last(G,m) is reset. Sine a non-faulty node exeuted
Line M4 at time t, the set of messages ausing it to exeute Line M4 should ause all other non-faulty
node to exeute Line M2 at some time past t−4d. Thus, this is the earliest time at whih some non-faulty
node may have set last(G,m) and will not set it later. Therefore, no non-faulty node will exeute Line M4
in the interval [t+ 8d, t+ 2∆
rmv
+ 5d].
Observe that the above arguments imply that if t¯ is the latest time the interval [t − 4d, t + 8d] at
whih a non-faulty node exeutes Line M4, then no non-faulty node will exeute Line M2 or Line M4 with
(G,m) earlier than t¯+ 2∆
rmv
+ 5d.
Claim 3 implies the following.
Corollary 4. If two non-faulty nodes exeute Line M4 with (G,m) at some time t1, t2, respetively, for
t1, t2 > ι0 + 10d, then either |t1 − t2| ≤ 7d or |t1 − t2| > 2∆rmv.
Claim 4. If no non-faulty node exeutes Line M2 (or Line M4) with (G,m) in an interval (t, t+ 2∆
rmv
],
for t > ι0 + ∆rmv, then no non-faulty node will exeute Line N2 or Line N4 with (G,m) in the interval
[t+∆
rmv
, t′′], where t+2∆
rmv
< t′′ and some non-faulty node exeutes Line M4 with (G,m) at time t′′.
Proof. Beause t > ι0 + ∆rmv, all non-faulty nodes have deayed all messages that appeared as part of
the initial state that may have not been atually sent. Sine we assume that no non-faulty node exeutes
Line M2 with (G,m) in the interval (t, t + 2∆
rmv
], by t + ∆
rmv
all will have reset ready
G,m
and will
not exeute Line N2 or Line N4 any more, so no non-faulty node will send a new ready message. By
t + 2∆
rmv
, all will deay all previous (ready,G,m) messages that were sent by non-faulty nodes. From
that time on, even if some non-faulty nodes will exeute Line M2, none will be able to exeute Line N2
until a new (ready,G,m) message is produed by a non-faulty node, thus until some non-faulty node
exeute Line M4 with (G,m).
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The proof makes use of the following simple observation.
Claim 5. At any time t, t > ι + ∆
rmv
, if a non-faulty node sets i_values[G,m], then some non-faulty
node has sent (support,G,m) later than rt(i_values[G,m]).
Proof. If the node didi it in Line K2, then it trivially holds. Otherwise, the time window onsidered in
Line L2 inludes a sending event of a orret node, and that happened at the earliest d time units before
the time window span.
Using the above laims we an now prove the following.
Lemma 2. One the system is stable, if any orret node, say q, exeutes Line N4 with (G,m), at some
time t¯, where t¯− rt(τGq ) ≤ ∆rmv − 9d, then
1. all orret nodes will exeute Line N4 with (G,m) within 2d of eah other in the interval [t¯−2d, t¯+2d];
2. for any orret node p, |rt(τGq )− rt(τ
G
p )| ≤ 6d;
3. some orret node exeuted Line M4 later than t¯−∆
rmv
+ 7d
Proof. Let q be suh a orret node. By the ondition in Line N3, ready
G,m
was last set by q while
exeuting Line M2 at some time t′, later than t¯−∆
rmv
. Consider the interval (ι0+∆rmv, t¯−∆rmv− 9d).
By the denition of stability it is longer than 4∆
rmv
. If no orret node exeuted Line M4 (with G,m) in
this interval, sine the system is stable, then the preonditions of Claim 4 hold.
Otherwise, let t1 be the latest time in the above interval at whih a orret node exeuted Line M4.
By denition |t′− t1| > 9d. Therefore, by Corollary 4 and Corollary 3, |t
′− t1| > 2∆rmv and this holds for
any other orret node that exeuted Line M4 or Line M2 within 9d of q, i.e., within 9d of t′. Therefore,
again, the preonditions of Claim 4 hold.
By Claim 5, some orret node have sent (support,G,m) in the interval [rt(τGq ), t¯]. By the ode of
the primitive, it would have not done so if any orret node would have exeuted Line M2 or Line M4 in
the interval [t¯−∆
rmv
, rt(τGq )− 2d], sine it would have set its last(G,m) at least d prior to that sending.
This implies that t′ ≥ rt(τGq ) − 2d, and that any orret node exeuting Line M2 or Line M4 within
9d of t′ should do so later than t2, where t2 = rt(τ
G
q )− 2d ≥ t¯−∆rmv + 7d.
By Claim 4, some orret node exeuted Line M4, in the interval [t¯−∆
rmv
− 9d, t¯]. Sine it should be
within 9d of t′, by the above argument, that should happen at some time t3 in the interval [t2, t¯]. Proving
the third item of the laim. By the ode of the primitive, every orret node should exeute Line M2 in
the interval [t3 − 5d, t3 + d]. This implies that they should do so in the interval [t2, t¯+ d], whih implies
within the interval I = [t¯−∆
rmv
+ 7d, t¯ + d].
The orret node q exeuted Line N4 at time t¯. It has reeived at least t+ 1 (ready,G,m) messages
from orret nodes. Any orret node sending suh a message should have exeuted Line M2 prior to
sending the message; and suh a message is a result of exeuting either Line M4 or Line N2. By Claim 4
that an happen either before time t1 +∆rmv or later than time t2. If it would be earlier than t1 +∆rmv,
node q would have deayed that message from its memory sine we already argued that |t′− t1| > 2∆rmv.
We onlude that all suh messages from orret nodes were sent past time t2. Therefore, by t¯ + d
eah orret node would exeute Line N2, sine its pre-onditions holds, and by t¯ + 2d all will exeute
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Line N4. Let q′ be the rst orret node to exeute Line N4 past time t2. The above arguments imply
that it has done so in the interval [t¯− 2d, t¯+2d], and that all orret nodes would have exeuted Line N4
within 2d of q′. Proving the rst item of the laim.
From the above disussion, some orret node q′′ exeuted Line M4 in the interval [t¯−∆
rmv
+ 6d, t¯].
Denote that time by t′′. Node q′′ olleted n − f approve messages in the interval [t′′ − 3d, t′′]. At
least one of whih is from a orret node. Let q′ be that node and let t′ be the time it sent its approve
message. From the above disussion, t′ ∈ [t¯ − ∆
rmv
+ 6d − 3d − d, t¯] = [t¯ − ∆
rmv
+ 2d, t¯]. Node q′
olleted n− f support messages, with at least n− 2f from orret nodes. Let t1 be the time at whih
the (n− 2f)th support message sent by a orret node was reeived by q′. Sine q′ exeuted Line L4, all
these messages should have been reeived in the interval [t1− 2d, t1]. Node q
′
should have set a reording
time τ, rt(τ) ≥ t1 − 4d, as a result of (maybe repeating) the exeution of Line L2.
Every other orret node should have reeived the (n− 2f)th support message sent by a orret node
at some time in the interval [t1 − d, t1 + d] with the set of (n − 2f) support messages sent by orret
nodes being reeived in the interval [t1− 3d, t1+ d]. Eah suh orret node should have set the reording
time after (maybe repeatedly) exeuting Line L2, sine this window satises the preondition of Line L1.
Thus, eventually all reording times are ≥ t1 − 5d. Observe that sine this interval is short, none of these
messages would have been deayed by the time they are proessed by the orret nodes.
Some orret node may send a support message, by exeuting Line K2, at most d time units after
reeiving these n− 2f messages. This an not take plae later than t1 +2d, resulting in a reording time
of t1 + d, though earlier than its time of sending the support message. This support message (with the
possible help of faulty nodes) an ause some orret node to exeute Line L2 at some later time. The
window within whih the support messages at that node are olleted should inlude the real-time t1+3d,
the latest time any support from any orret node ould have been reeived. Any suh exeution will
result in a reording time that is ≤ t1+3d− 2d = t1+ d. Thus the range of reording times for all orret
nodes (inluding q) are [t1 − 5d, t1 + d].
To omplete the proof of the seond item we need to show that eah orret node, p, atually sets
its τGp . By assumption, t¯ − rt(τ
G
q ) ≤ ∆rmv − 9d, therefore rt(τ
G
q ) ≥ t¯ − ∆rmv + 9d, This implies that
t1+d ≥ t¯−∆rmv+9d. Implying that t1−5d ≥ t¯−∆rmv+3d. Therefore, when eah orret node exeutes
Line N4, its τG is well dened, sine the i_values[G,m] entry wasn't deayed yet. Thus, ompleting the
proof.
We are now ready to prove the properties of the primitive Initiator-Aept.
Theorem 1. One the system is stable, the primitive Initiator-Aept presented in Figure 2 satises
properties [IA-1℄ through [IA-4℄.
Proof.
Corretness: Corollary 2 proves that when a orret General initiates the primitive, the data-strutures at
orret nodes are fresh. Assume that within d of eah other all orret nodes invoke Initiator-Aept
(G,m). Let t1 be the real-time at whih the General invokes its opy of the Initiator-Aept then
by t2, t2 ≤ t1 + d, the last orret node did so. Sine all data strutures are fresh, then no value {G,m
′}
appeared in i_values[G, ∗] d time units before that, thus Line K1 will hold for all orret nodes. Therefore,
every orret node sends (support,G,m). Eah suh message reahes all other orret nodes within d.
Thus, between t1 and t2 + d every orret node reeives (support,G,m) from n − f distint nodes and
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sends (approve,G,m). By t2 + 2d every orret node sends (ready,G,m), and by t2 + 3d I-aepts
〈G,m, τ ′〉, for some τ ′, thus, proving [IA-1A℄.
To prove [IA-1B℄, let q be the rst to I-aept after exeuting Line M4. Within d all orret nodes will
exeute Line M2, and within 2d all will I-aept.
Note that for every pair of orret nodes q and q′, the assoiated initial reording times τ and τ ′ satisfy
|τ − τ ′| ≤ d. Line K2 implies that the reording times of orret nodes an not be earlier than t1 − d.
Some orret node may see n − 2f, with the help of faulty nodes as late as t2 + 2d. All suh windows
should ontain a support from a orret node, so should inlude real-time t2 + d, resulting in a reording
time of t2 − d. Reall that t2 ≤ t1 + d, proving [IA-1C℄.
To prove [IA-1D℄ notie that the fastest node may set τ ′ to be t1 − d, but may I-aept only by
t2 + 3d ≤ t1 + 4d.
Unforgeability:
If no orret node invokes Initiator-Aept and will not send (support,G,m), then no orret node
will ever exeute L4 and will not send (ready,G,m). Thus, no orret node an aumulate n−f distint
(ready,G,m) messages and therefore will not I-aept 〈G,m〉. Moreover, no orret will exeute lines
K2 or L2, and therefore if G is orret, no orret node will invoke Initiator-Aept, and no orret
will have any entry in the Initiator's data struture.
∆
agr
-Relay:
Let q be a orret node that I-aepts 〈G,m, τGq 〉 at real-time t, suh that 0 ≤ t − rt(τ
G
q ) ≤ ∆agr. It
did so as a result of exeuting Line N4. By assumption the preonditions of Lemma 2 hold, and therefore
all orret nodes will I-aept 〈G,m, τq¯〉 within 2d of eah other, in the interval [t− 2d, t+ 2d], with τ
G
values that are 6d apart. Thus, proving [IA-3A℄.
To prove [IA-3B℄ notie that any range of messages onsidered in Line L2 inludes a support of a orret
node. The resulting reording time will never be later than the sending time of the support message by
that orret node, and thus by some orret node.
The rst part of [IA-3C℄ is immediate from Line L2 and Line K2. For the seond part observe that for
every other orret node q′, rt(τq′) ≤ rt(τq) + 2d and rt(τ
G
q′ ) ≥ rt(τ
G
q ) − 6d. Thus, rt(τq′) − rt(τ
G
q′ ) ≤
rt(τq)− rt(τ
G
q ) + 8d ≤ ∆agr + 8d.
Uniqueness:
To prove [IA-4℄ observe that the onditions in Line K1 implies that eah non-faulty node sends a support
for a single m at a time. In order to I-aept, a orret node needs to send approve after reeiving n− f
support messages. That an happen for at most a single value of m, beause n > 3f.
By Lemma 2, one a orret node exeute Line N4, all do it within 2d. By the protool, one a node
deides it removes aepted messages and ignores new message assoiated with (G,m) for 3d. Therefore,
all orret nodes issue I-aept, and stop sending messages assoiated with (G,m) before a orret one
agrees to onsider suh messages. So past messages annot be used again to reprodue another wave of
deisions, unless a new orret node sends a new support for (G,m).
Previously sent messages for another value of m will not produe a wave of deisions unless a new
orret node will send (support,G,m) for suh a value. None will send support for a new value for
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∆0 − 6d > 6d, so by the time suh a message will be sent, old values will be out of any window of
onsideration for exeuting any L or M lines of the ode by a any orret node. Line N annot be exeuted
unless some orret node exuses Line M4.
What is left to prove, is that future invoations of the primitive will not violate [IA-4℄.
Again, by Lemma 2, one a orret node exeute Line N4, all do it within 2d. Let q be the rst to
exute Line N4 in the urrent exeution, and let it be at time rt(τp) = t
′. By t′ + d all non-faulty would
exeute Line L2, and the latest any orret will exeute Line K2 is t′ + d. By inspeting the possible
senarios one an see that no non-faulty will exeute Line L2 later than t′ + 5d, and the latest value
set by any orret node in that interval will never be later than t′ + d. Thus, for every orret node q,
rt(τGq ) ≤ rt(τp) + d.
The earliest time at whih any orret node will send (support,G,m) later than that time will be at
rt(τp) + ∆0 − 6d. By inspeting the protool, the earliest possible setting of value in Line K2 will be to
rt(τp) +∆0 − 6d− 2d. Therefore, if we denote by τ timings in the former invoation and by τ¯ timings in
the later one, we onlude that for any two orret nodes p and q, rt(τ¯Gq)− rt(τ
G
p ) ≥ ∆0− 9d = 4d.
We an now state the onluding orollary.
Corollary 5. The system onverge from any initial state within 2 ×∆
reset
= d, provided that there are
n− t non-faulty nodes that are ontinuously non-faulty during that period.
Proof. Sine all properties hold one the system is stable, and stability is dened as 2 ×∆
reset
form the
time the network is orret, we onlude the proof.
One an redue the requirement of having the same non-faulty nodes stay ontinuously so, but we do
not see this optimization as an important issue. Moreover, the proofs above shows that one a non-faulty
node disards old values it an be onsidered orret. Therefore we an state the following orollary.
Corollary 6. One the system is stable, a non-faulty node that is non-faulty for ∆
node
time, an be
onsidered orret.
6.2 Proof of the msgd-broadast Properties
The proofs essentially follow the arguments in the original paper [14℄.
Lemma 3. If a orret node pi sends a message at loal-time τi, τi ≤ τ
G
i + r · Φ on pi's timer it will be
reeived and proessed by eah orret node pj at some loal-time τj, τj ≤ τ
G
j +(r+1) ·Φ, on pj 's timer.
Proof. Assume that node pi sends a message at real-time t with loal-time τi ≤ τ
G
i + r · Φ. Thus,
τi ≤ τ
G
i + r(t
G
skew
+ 2d). It should arrive at any orret node pj within d. By IA-3A, τ
G
j will be dened
and the message will be proessed no later than by another d. By IA-3A, |rt(τGi )− rt(τ
G
j )| < t
G
skew
. Thus,
rt(τGi ) ≤ rt(τ
G
j ) + t
G
skew
, and at time rt(τj), by whih the message arrived and proessed at pj, we get
rt(τj) ≤ rt(τi) + 2d ≤ rt(τ
G
i ) + r(t
G
skew
+ 2d) + 2d ,
and therefore
rt(τj) ≤ rt(τ
G
j ) + t
G
skew
+ r(tG
skew
+ 2d) + 2d ≤ rt(τGj ) + (r + 1) · Φ .
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Lemma 4. If a orret node ever sends (echo′, p,m, k) then at least one orret node, say q′, must have
sent (echo′, p,m, k) at some loal-time τq′, τq′ ≤ τ
G
q′ + (2k + 2) · Φ.
Proof. Let t be the earliest real-time by whih any orret node q sends the message (echo′, p,m, k). If
t > rt(τGq )+(2k+2) ·Φ, node q should have reeived (echo
′, p,m, k) from n−2f distint nodes, at least
one of whih from a orret node, say q′, that was sent prior to loal loal-time τGq′ + (2k + 2) · Φ.
Lemma 5. If a orret node ever sends (echo′, p,m, k) then p's message (init, p,m, k) must have been
reeived by at least one orret node, say q′, at some time τq′, τq′ ≤ τ
G
q′ + 2k · Φ.
Proof. By Lemma 4, if a orret node ever sends (echo′, p,m, k), then some orret node q should send it
at loal-time τq, τq ≤ τ
G
q +(2k+2)·Φ. By the primitivemsgd-broadast, q have reeived (init
′, p,m, k)
from at least n− f nodes by some loal-time τq, τq ≤ τ
G
q + (2k+2) ·Φ. At least one of them is a orret
node q′′ who have reeived n− 2f (echo, p,m, k) at some loal-time τq′′, τq′′ ≤ τ
G
q′′+(2k+1) ·Φ. One of
whih was sent by a orret node q¯ that should have reeived (init, p,m, k) before sending (echo, p,m, k)
at some loal-time τq¯, τq¯ ≤ τ
G
q¯ + 2k · Φ.
Lemma 6. If a orret node p invokes the primitive msgd-broadast (p,m, k) at real-time tp, then
eah orret node q aepts (p,m, k) at some real-time tq, suh that |tp − tq)| ≤ 3d.
Proof. The init message of p sent in Line V will arrive to every node by tp + d. By IA-3A, by tp + 2d all
will have their τG dened and will proess the init message. By Lemma 3, all will exeute Line W3 by
that time. By tp + 3d all will exeute Line X5 and will aept.
Theorem 2. The msgd-broadast primitive presented in Figure 3 satises properties [TSP-1℄ through
[TSP-4℄.
Proof. Corretness: Assume that a orret node p msgd-broadasts (p,m, k) at τp, τp ≤ τ
G
p +(2k−
1) ·Φ, on its timer. Any orret node, say q, reeives (init, p,m, k) and sends (echo, p,m, k) at some τq,
τq ≤ τ
G
q + 2k · Φ on its timer. Thus, any orret node, say q¯ reeives n − f (echo, p,m, k) from distint
nodes at some τq¯, τq¯ ≤ τ
G
q¯ + (2k + 1) · Φ, on its timer and aepts (p,m, k). The seond part of the
orretness is a result of Lemma 6.
Unforgeability: If a orret node p does not broadast (p,m, k), it does not send (init, p,m, k), and
no orret node will send (echo, p,m, k) at some τ, τ ≤ τG + 2k ·Φ, on its timer. Thus, no orret node
aepts (p,m, k) by τG + (2k + 1) · Φ on its timer. If a orret node would have aepted (p,m, k) at a
later time it an be only as a result of reeiving n − f (echo′, p,m, k) distint messages, some of whih
must be from orret nodes. By Lemma 5, p should have sent (init, p,m, k), a ontradition.
Relay: The deliate point is when a orret node issues an aept as a result of getting eho messages.
So assume that q1 aepts (p,m, k) at t1 = rt(τ1) as a result of exeuting Line X5. By that time it must
have reeived (echo, p,m, k) from n−f nodes, at least n−2f of them sent by orret nodes. Sine every
orret node among these has sent its message by τG+2k ·Φ on its timer, by Lemma 3, all those messages
should have arrived to every orret node qi by τi ≤ τ
G
i + (2k + 1) · Φ on its timer. Thus, every orret
node qi should have sent (init
′, p,m, k) at some τi, τi ≤ τ
G
i +(2k+1) ·Φ, on its timer. As a result, every
orret node will reeive n− f suh messages by some τ¯ , τ¯ ≤ τG+(2k+2) ·Φ on its timer and will send
(echo′, p,m, k) at that time, whih will lead eah orret node to aept (p,m, k) at a loal-time τi.
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Now observe that all n−2f (echo, p,m, k) were sent before time t1. By t1+d they arrive to all orret
nodes. By t1 + 2d all will have their τ
G
dened and will proess them. By t1 + 3d their (init
′, p,m, k)
will arrive to all orret nodes, whih will lead all orret nodes to send (echo′, p,m, k). Thus, all orret
nodes will aept (p,m, k) at time τi ≤ t1 + 4d.
By assumption, t1 = rt(τ1) ≤ rt(τ
G
1
) + r · Φ. By IA-3A, rt(τG
1
) ≤ rt(τGi ) + t
G
skew
. Therefore we
onlude: rt(τi) ≤ rt(τ1)+ 4d ≤ rt(τ
G
1
)+ r ·Φ+4d ≤ rt(τGi )+ t
G
skew
+ r ·Φ+4d ≤ rt(τGi )+ (r+2) ·Φ.
The ase that the aept is a result of exeuting Line Z5 is a speial ase of the above arguments.
Detetion of broadasters: As in the original proof ([14℄), we rst argue the seond part. Assume
that a orret node q adds node p to broadcasters. It should have reeived n−2f (init′, p,m, k) messages.
Thus, at least one orret node has sent (init′, p,m, k) as a result of reeiving n − 2f (echo, p,m, k)
messages. One of these should be from a orret node that has reeived the original broadast message
of p.
To prove the rst part, we onsider two similar ases to support the Relay property. If r = k and the
orret node, say q, aepts (p,m, k) as a result of reeiving (echo, p,m, k) from n − f nodes by some
τq, τq ≤ τ
G
q + (2k + 1) · Φ, on its timer. At least n − 2f of them were sent by orret nodes. Sine
eah orret node among these has sent its message at some τ, τ ≤ τG + 2k · Φ, by Lemma 3, all those
messages should have arrived to any orret node, say qi, by some τi, τi ≤ τ
G
i + (2k+1) ·Φ on its timer.
Thus, eah orret node, say qj should have sent (init
′, p,m, k) at some τj , τj ≤ τ
G
j + (2k + 1) · Φ, on
its timer. As a result, by Lemma 3, eah orret node, say q′, will reeive n − f suh messages by some
τq′, τq′ ≤ τ
G
q′ + (2k + 2) · Φ on its timer and will add p to broadcasters.
Otherwise, q aepts (p,m, k) as a result of reeiving from n − f nodes (echo′, p,m, k) by some τq
on its timer. By Lemma 4 a orret node, say qi, sent (echo
′, p,m, k) at some τi, τi ≤ τ
G
i + (2k+2) ·Φ.
It should have reeived n− f (init′, p,m, k) messages by that time. All suh messages that were sent by
orret nodes were sent at some τ, τ ≤ τG + (2k + 1) ·Φ, on their timers and should arrive at eah node
qj, at some τj , τj ≤ τ
G
j + (2k + 2) · Φ, on its timer. Sine there are at least n − 2f suh messages, all
will add p to broadcasters at some τ, τ ≤ τG + (2k + 2) · Φ, on their timers.
6.3 Proof of the ss-Byz-Agree Properties
Theorem 3. (Convergene) One the system is stable, any invoation of ss-Byz-Agree presented in
Figure 1 satises the Termination property. When n > 3f , it also satises the Agreement and Validity
properties.
Proof. Notie that the General G itself is one of the nodes, so if it is faulty then there are only f − 1
potentially faulty nodes. We do not use that fat in the proof sine the version of ss-Byz-Agree
presented does not refer expliitly to the General. One an adapt the proof and redue ∆
agr
by 2 ·Φ when
speially handling that ase.
By Corollary 2, by the time the system beomes stable, all data strutures are fresh.
We begin by proving Validity.
Validity: Sine all the orret nodes invoke the primitive ss-Byz-Agree as a result of a value sent by
a orret G, they will all invoke Initiator-Aept within d of eah other with fresh data struture,
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hene [IA-1℄ implies that they all will exeute Blok R within 2d of eah other, and Validity holds.
The rest of the proof makes use of the following two lemmata.
Lemma 7. If a orret node p aborts at loal-time τp, τp > τ
G
p +(2r+1) ·Φ, on its timer, then no orret
node q deides at a time τq, τq ≥ τ
G
q + (2r + 1) · Φ, on its timer.
Proof. Let p be a orret node that aborts at time τp, τp > τ
G
p + (2r + 1) · Φ. In this ase it should
have identied at most r − 2 broadasters by that time. By the detetion of the broadasters property
[TPS-4℄, no orret node will ever aept 〈G,m′〉 and r− 1 distint messages (qi,m
′, i) for 1 ≤ i ≤ r− 1,
sine that would have aused eah orret node, inluding p, to hold r − 1 broadasters by some time
τ, τ ≤ τG + (2(r − 1) + 2) · Φ on its timer. Thus, no orret node, say q, an deide at a time
τq ≥ τ
G
q + (2r + 1) · Φ on its timer.
Lemma 8. If a orret node p deides at time τp, τp ≤ τ
G
p + (2r + 1) ·Φ, on its timer, then eah orret
node, say q, deides by some time τq, τq ≤ τ
G
q + (2r + 3) · Φ on its timer.
Proof. Let p be a orret node that deides at loal-time τp, τp ≤ τ
G
p + (2r + 1) · Φ. We onsider the
following ases:
1. r = 0 : No orret node an abort by a time τ, τ ≤ τG + (2r + 1) · Φ, sine the inequality will not
hold. Assume that node p have aepted 〈G,m′〉 by τp ≤ τ
G
p +4d ≤ τ
G
p +Φ. By the relay property
[TPS-3℄ eah orret node will aept 〈G,m′〉 by some time τ, τ ≤ τG+3 ·Φ on its timer. Moreover,
p invokes msgd-broadast(p,m′, 1), by the Corretness property [TPS-1℄ it will be aepted by
eah orret node by time τ, τ ≤ τG+3 ·Φ, on its timer. Thus, all orret nodes will have value 6=⊥
and will broadast and stop by time τG + 3 · Φ on their timers, when exeuting Blok S.
2. 1 ≤ r ≤ f−1 : Node p must have aepted 〈G,m′〉 and also aepted r distint (qi,m
′, i) messages
for all i, 2 ≤ i ≤ r, by time τ, τ ≤ τG + (2r + 1) · Φ, on its timer. By Lemma 7, no orret node
aborts by that time. By Relay property [TPS-3℄ eah (qi,m
′, i) message will be aepted by eah
orret node by some time τ, τ ≤ τG + (2r + 3) ·Φ, on its timer. Node p broadasts (p,m′, r + 1)
before stopping. By the Corretness property, [TPS-1℄, this message will be aepted by every orret
node at some time τ, τ ≤ τG + (2r+ 3) ·Φ, on its timer. Thus, no orret node will abort by time
τ, τ ≤ τG + (2r + 3) · Φ, and all orret nodes will have value 6=⊥ and will thus deide by that
time.
3. r = f : Node p must have aepted a (qi,m
′, i) message for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ f − 1, by τp, τp ≤
τGp + (2f + 1) · Φ, on its timer, where the f qi's are distint. If the General G is orret, then by
Validity the laim holds. Otherwise, at least one of these f nodes (whih all dier from G), say
qj, must be orret. By the Unforgeability property [TPS-2℄, node qj invoked msgd-broadast
(qj ,m
′, j) by some loal-time τ, τ ≤ τG+(2j+1)·Φ and deided. Sine j ≤ f the above arguments
imply that by some loal-time τ, τ ≤ τG + (2f + 1) · Φ, eah orret node will deide.
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Lemma 8 implies that if a orret node deides at time τ, τ ≤ τG + (2r + 1) · Φ, on its timer, then no
orret node p aborts at time τp, τp > τ
G
p + (2r + 1) · Φ. Lemma 7 implies the other diretion.
Termination: Eah orret node either terminates the protool by returning a value, or by time (2f +1) ·
Φ+ 3d on its lok all entries will be reset, whih is a termination of the protool.
Agreement: If no orret node deides, then all orret nodes that exeute the protool abort, and return
a ⊥ value. Otherwise, let q be the rst orret node to deide. Therefore, no orret node aborts. The
value returned by q is the value m′ of the aepted (p,m′, 1) message. By [IA-4℄ if any orret node
I-aept s, all orret nodes I-aept with a single value. Thus all orret nodes return the same value.
Timeliness:
1. (agreement) For every two orret nodes q and q′ that deide on (G,m) at τq and τq′ , respetively:
(a) If validity hold, then |rt(τq)− rt(τq′)| ≤ 2d, by [IA-3A℄; Otherwise, |rt(τq)− rt(τq′)| ≤ 3d, by
[TPS-1℄.
(b) |rt(τGq )− rt(τ
G
q′ )| ≤ 6d by [IA-3A℄.
() rt(τGq ), rt(τ
G
q′ ) ∈ [t1 − 2d, t2] by [IA-3B℄.
(d) rt(τGr ) ≤ rt(τr), by [IA-3C℄, and if the inequality rt(τr)− rt(τ
G
r ) ≤ ∆agr would not hold, the
node would abort right away.
2. (validity) If all orret nodes invoked the protool in an interval [t0, t0+d], as a result of (Initiator, G,m)
sent by a orret G that spaed the sending by 6d from its last agreement, then for every orret
node q that may have deided 3d later than G, the new invoation will still happen with fresh
data strutures, sine they are reset 3d after deision. By that time it already reset the data
strutures (inluding latest_aept) of the last exeution, and the new deision time τq, satises
t0 − d ≤ rt(τ
G
q ) ≤ rt(τq) ≤ t0 + 4d as implied by [IA-1D℄.
3. (separation) By [IA-4℄ the real-times of the I-aepts satisfy the requirements. Sine a node will not
reset its data strutures before terminating the protool, it will not send a support before ompleting
the previous protool exeution. Therefore, the protool itself an only inrease the time dierene
between agreements. Thus, the minimal dierene is ahieved when a deision takes plae right
after the termination of the primitive Initiator-Aept.
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